Title of the Assignment

An interaction with a philosophical document from the early modern/modern periods with significance for the relationship between Christianity and a major philosophical issue.

Summarise the key ideas of the document below, and outline what contribution (or questions) it makes/raises for the relationship between Christianity and the philosophical perspective or issue represented in the document. Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the document from the standpoint of alternative philosophical perspectives and Christian theology.

Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling

Commentary

This one wasn’t such a good result at 76%. Kierkegaard’s “Fear and Trembling” was not analysed particularly well I am afraid. I did struggle with it honestly. The lecturer correctly states that I spent a little too much time describing the text rather than critically analysing it. Live and learn, sadly.

Abstract

Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling is an enigmatic text that draws its title from Paul’s admonition to “work out your own salvation with fear and trembling” (Phil 2:12).  Writing under the non-de-plume, Johannes de silentio, the reader is encouraged to consider Abraham’s intended sacrifice of Isaac as a means of understanding faith and an individual’s choice to act in faith.  The book is somewhat of a polemic against Hegel and Kant who advocated in different ways for a subsuming of ethical acts in the ethics of the greater society.  It explores Abraham’s “greatness” through three “problemas” that directly challenge Hegel’s system of ethics.  The first problema is whether it is right to suspend these societal ethics in favour of a greater end.  The second is whether one’s duty to God can be incompatible with society’s ethics and the third is whether it was right for Abraham to conceal his intent contrary to society’s expectation of disclosure in such a situation.  There are many levels that this book operates on, from the surface exploration of personal faith through to God’s sovereignty in working in individuals “for his good pleasure” (Phil 2:12).  Kierkegaard’s philosophy, expressed in this work and others, has influenced following philosophers into the 20^th Century and continues to impact modern thought.

Fear and Trembling

Søren Kierkegaard writing under the non-de-plume, Johannes de silentio, writes an indirect polemic against Hegel and Kant in a book which takes its title from Philippians 2:12[1] “… work out your own salvation with fear and trembling…”.  Kierkegaard uses Abraham, the father of the faithful, as the subject of his disagreement with Hegel.  Johannes de silentio is more than a non-de-plume, and instead is a way for the writer to explore a topic without attributing the ideas expressed as specifically his own.[2] In a sense, Kierkegaard steps out of his own experience by using the avatar of Johannes to explore how the topic impacts the reader to either attract or repel in the moment.[3]  In the story of Abraham and his attempted sacrifice of Isaac, he has chosen an apt subject to test Hegel and Kant by exploring the nature of an act that stepped outside of universal ethics suggested by Kantian concepts of good and goodwill and Hegelian ethical freedom.[4]

Fear and Trembling resists simplistic interpretation.  A key tension in understanding this book is the concept of Abraham’s greatness, given that he must be considered a murderer save for God’s intervention after the act had already begun.  Alistair Hannay notes that the traditional reading of Abraham and Isaac’s sacrifice story is of Abraham’s willingness to be an instrument of God’s omnipotence whereas, he asserts, “Kierkegaard’s Abraham is great because of what he suffers in a trial of faith.”[5]  Ronald  Green suggests a number of levels at which the text can be read, which we will explore further.[6]   The central theme of the book is an exploration of an individual’s relationship with God and how that relationship affects the life of the believer as opposed to Hegel and Kant’s more societal relationship approach.[7]  As a polemic against the prevailing philosophy where, under the guise of Hegelian philosophy, Christians pursued “good life-conduct”[8], Johannes speaks of “faith as a way of life” using Abraham as an example.[9]  He distances himself from the “system” of Hegelian thought, explicitly declaring in the preface, “This is not the System, it does not have the least thing to do with the System.”[10]  The Hegelian System postulates that between an individual’s rights, and the subject world is a stabilising effect called ethics (imposed by the State).[11]  Johannes argues that Abraham as an individual was able to engage with the ultimate ethical arbiter, God himself, and make an individual choice, in this case of obedience to the commanded sacrifice, without reference to family or society or State.[12]

Fear and Trembling starts with a preface, alerting the reader to the cheapening of faith in the comparison of commerce and ideas and by juxtaposing doubt and faith.[13]  In “Tuning Up” or “Exordium”, Johannes describes the story of Abraham’s obedience in the sacrifice of Isaac from four perspectives.[14] This is followed by a speech in favour of Abraham.  This speech takes a quite different tone to the “Tuning Up” and is a celebration of Abraham’s faith.[15]  Johannes argues in this speech for Abraham’s greatness by virtue of his love, expectation and struggle.[16]  The “Preliminary Expectoration” (which gives the sense of the author clearing his throat before launching into his topic[17]) or “Preamble from the Heart”[18] which follows the “Tuning Up”, concerns itself with three heartfelt matters, love, suffering and courage.[19] Johannes makes the point that the so-called movement of infinity (shorthand for the movement from resignation to faith) requires passion, noting that our age lacks passion, and in so doing elucidates his rejection of Hegel’s “[explanation of] everything”.[20]  This is key.  Scruton notes that Kierkegaard’s principal target was Hegel who subsumes responsibility for action away from individuals to a passionless, community “universal morals”.[21] This call to passionate choice was away from the cliché-ridden, worldly piety of the established church into an exploration of relationship with God to an individual mind, not a State regulated one.[22]  The preamble introduces the concept of a distinction between resignation and faith (represented by two knights), asserting faith cannot exist except it is preceded by resignation – that one must become resigned to the loss of a cherished hope but that one can form faith in expectation that this hope will be fulfilled, and that the move from resignation to faith is an individual decision.[23]

The book then launches into an examination of three “Problems” (Problemas) in understanding Abraham from a “Universal” ethics[24] perspective.  Each problem tackles an ethical question designed to demonstrate that “certain principles of Hegelian philosophy are untenable”.[25]  The first of these is whether it is appropriate to suspend ethics in favour of some higher purpose or “telos” and engages directly with Hegel’s “Ethical Life” (Sittlichkeit) which asserts that “behaviour is moral when it contributes to the maintenance of the ethical unit formed by any society”.[26]  The context of Hegelian philosophy and therefore of Kierkegaard’s objection references Kant’s moral theory based around the view that morality is essentially universal, “applying equally to everyone and at all times”.[27]  In preparing to kill his son, Abraham would be doing nothing for the benefit of society in the universal sense and therefore, in favour of an “end” or “telos” (his relationship with God[28]), Abraham was suspending the “Universally” accepted ethics.[29]  The text also debates whether ethics are indeed universal in the Kantian or Hegelian sense.[30]

The second “problem” is similar to the first but delves into an issue canvassed in dealing with the first problem – whether the faith of the individual is incompatible with the ethics of the community.[31]  In essence this problem asserts that either the Christian owes an absolute duty to God, or Abraham is lost.[32]  This introduces the question of whether the universal ethic is in fact the same as duty to God and therefore every dutiful act within the universal is Godly.[33]  Kant asserts that if God’s request of Abraham is found to be in opposition to the universal, then Abraham must consider the perceived will of God as an “apparition” to be ignored.[34]  To counter this, Johannes refers to Luke 14:26 “If anyone comes to me and does not hate his own [family], yes and even his own life, he cannot be my disciple.”[35]  The point illustrated by Abraham’s sacrifice and Jesus’ exhortation is precisely that God’s will is not necessarily aligned with community morals regarding the obligations of a father or family member.[36]  Johannes does note however that the “knight of faith” always acts out of love, even if that love cannot be understood.[37]

A troubling aspect is that from the time of Yahweh’s command to Isaac’s query on Mt Moriah (Gen 22:1-19), Abraham does not let anyone know what he is intending.  Concealment and deception is dealt with in the third problem.[38]  Hannay asserts in relation to this “Problema” that Abraham “supposes himself to have an absolute duty to God that overrides the ethical… and he cannot reveal his intention to the parties concerned.”[39]  Luther argues that Abraham did not wish to torture Isaac (or others) with the knowledge prematurely.[40]  The “Universal” suggests that Abraham should have disclosed.[41]  Johannes casts the argument in terms of “aesthetic” immediacy or immediate gratification, more aligned to Hegel’s “moment in time” than Kant’s more contemplative aesthetic.[42]  The immediate concern would be full disclosure for immediate resolution of the tension of disclosure (an “aesthetic” response) but instead Abraham is unable to articulate his intention, keeping it concealed so that he does not fail the test.[43]  The book closes with an epilogue repeating two of the ideas from the preface regarding the decline and the sufficiency of faith.[44]

Green[45] notes many levels to Johannes de silentio’s book.  At the most apparent level, it is a critique of popular and cultural Christianity and a call to personal faith.[46]  At a deeper level, the book explores faith especially by describing the “movement” of the faithful from the “knight of infinite resignation” to the “knight of faith”.[47] At yet another level, it explores “the norms that should guide the conduct of a committed Christian” especially in Problema II, the suspension of universal morals in favour of obedience to God.[48]  Johannes asserts that “Faith is the paradox that the single individual (“the particular”) is higher than the universal”.[49] At still another level, it addresses the question, “how can the individual believer be saved from sin?”[50]  This arises from the Christological interpretation of the story where Isaac, is the child of promise identified by Paul and in Hebrews (Gal 3:13-14; Heb 11:17-19).[51] Johannes asserts that God steps outside of the normal ethical model to intervene individually to redeem.[52]  The title of the book hints at this level, being drawn from Philippians 2 “… work out your salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God who works in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure.”  God works in us individually, according to his sovereignty, to achieve our redemption.[53]  Green notes that Abraham is saved by a “direct, supra-ethical relationship to God.”[54]

Kierkegaard’s work influenced at least some of the existentialist thought of the following century, with Albert Camus using his concept of the “absurd”, Sartre using his ideas on decisions and Badiou likewise doing so and Heidegger drew on his themes of anxiety, repetition and mortality.  The book is described as enigmatic, open ended and inconclusive.[55]  For the modern reader, without a Hegelian and Kantian context, the core questions of the book about individuals, the nature of faith and the relationship between faith and ethics may be easily lost, particularly against the backdrop of cultural, socialised Christianity that Kierkegaard seeks to counter.[56] Against a further and perhaps more insidious backdrop of late 18^th and 19^th Century mass movements, from the French Revolution to incipient Marxism, Johannes’ call to individuality and individual faith is a feature of modern life.[57]  Ultimately, it is his portrayal of faith, in particular Abraham’s faith, as involving love, expectancy and struggle that perhaps resonates most with readers, Christian or not Christian.[58]

Kierkegaard, through his literary character, Johannes de silentio, in Fear and Trembling analyses individual choice and faith in direct relationship with God, absent the State.  He asks whether it is appropriate to suspend the ethics of society in favour of the end of obeying God, he asks whether duty to God is absolute and finally whether it is appropriate to conceal our intentions in undertaking God’s commands.  He presents the responses to these questions in an either/or context.  Either these things are so, or Abraham is lost.  In doing so, he points us to the foundation of the human state as regards God, the State and society at large.

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[1] Unless otherwise indicated, all Scripture quotations are from The ESV Bible (The Holy Bible, English Standard Version) copyright © 2001 by Crossway, a publishing ministry of Good News Publishers.  Used by permission.  All rights reserved

[2] Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Alastair Hannay (London, England: Penguin Books, 1985), 8,10-11, 17; Clare Carlisle, Kierkegaard’s “Fear and Trembling”: A Reader’s Guide (London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2010), 1, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/dtl/detail.action?docID=592430.

[3] Kierkegaard, FT, 8–9; Roger Scruton, A Short History of Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to Wittgenstein, 2nd Edition. (New York, USA: Routledge, 1995), 193.

[4] Scruton, Short History, 157, 216–17.

[5] Kierkegaard, FT, 7.

[6] Alastair Hannay and Gordon D Marino, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 258; see also Carlisle, F&T, 2.

[7] Carlisle, F&T, 2; Scruton, Short History, 192; Hannay and Marino, Kierkegaard, 259; Kierkegaard, FT, 13.

[8] Carlisle, F&T, 17; Scruton, Short History, 192.

[9] Hannay and Marino, Kierkegaard, 259.

[10] Carlisle, F&T, 38; Kierkegaard, FT, 43 cf. 11.

[11] Scruton, Short History, 216–17.

[12] Scruton, Short History, 193.

[13] Carlisle, F&T, 30.

[14] Kierkegaard, FT, 13, 45–48; Carlisle, F&T, 70.

[15] Carlisle, F&T, 56.

[16] Carlisle, F&T, 67.

[17] Carlisle, F&T, 70.

[18] Kierkegaard, FT, 57.

[19] Carlisle, F&T, 70.

[20] Carlisle, F&T, 71; Kierkegaard, FT, 71 (footnote); cf. Hannay and Marino, Kierkegaard, 259.

[21] Scruton, Short History, 192.

[22] Hannay and Marino, Kierkegaard, 259; Carlisle, F&T, 1.

[23] Kierkegaard, FT, 17–18.

[24] Carlisle, F&T, 99.

[25] Kierkegaard, FT, 15.

[26] Kierkegaard, FT, 15; Carlisle, F&T, 99.

[27] Carlisle, F&T, 100; Scruton, Short History, 193; Kierkegaard, FT, 16.

[28] Carlisle, F&T, 104.

[29] Carlisle, F&T, 103.

[30] Carlisle, F&T, 104; Kierkegaard, FT, 29.

[31] Carlisle, F&T, 120.

[32] Carlisle, F&T, 120.

[33] Carlisle, F&T, 120–21; Kierkegaard, FT, 16.

[34] Carlisle, F&T, 104–5; Kierkegaard, FT, 11; Scruton, Short History, 193.

[35] Carlisle, F&T, 127; Kierkegaard, FT, 99, 108.

[36] Carlisle, F&T, 127; Kierkegaard, FT, 29.

[37] Carlisle, F&T, 128–29; Scruton, Short History, 98.

[38] Carlisle, F&T, 130.

[39] Kierkegaard, FT, 28.

[40] referenced in Carlisle, F&T, 131.

[41] Carlisle, F&T, 132; Kierkegaard, FT, 28.

[42] Carlisle, F&T, 133; Scruton, Short History, 161, 193.

[43] Kierkegaard, FT, 28–29; Carlisle, F&T, 134.

[44] Carlisle, F&T, 171.

[45] Hannay and Marino, Kierkegaard, 258.

[46] Hannay and Marino, Kierkegaard, 259.

[47] Hannay and Marino, Kierkegaard, 261; Kierkegaard, FT, 77.

[48] Hannay and Marino, Kierkegaard, 263.

[49] Hannay and Marino, Kierkegaard, 263; Carlisle, F&T, 102; Kierkegaard, FT, 84.

[50] Hannay and Marino, Kierkegaard, 269.

[51] Hannay and Marino, Kierkegaard, 270.

[52] Carlisle, F&T, 113; Hannay and Marino, Kierkegaard, 271.

[53] Hannay and Marino, Kierkegaard, 272.

[54] Hannay and Marino, Kierkegaard, 273.

[55] Carlisle, F&T, viii and 176; sleeve notes Kierkegaard, FT.

[56] Carlisle, F&T, 176; Kierkegaard, FT, 36–37.

[57] Hannay and Marino, Kierkegaard, 257.

[58] Carlisle, F&T, 177.

Works Cited

Carlisle, Clare. Kierkegaard’s “Fear and Trembling”: A Reader’s Guide. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2010. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/dtl/detail.action?docID=592430.

Hannay, Alastair, and Gordon D Marino, eds. The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Kierkegaard, Søren. Fear and Trembling. Translated by Alastair Hannay. London, England: Penguin Books, 1985.

Scruton, Roger. A Short History of Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to Wittgenstein. 2nd Edition. New York, USA: Routledge, 1995.

Works Consulted

Conway, Daniel. “‘Seeing’ Is Believing: Narrative Visualization in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling.” Journal of Textual Reasoning 2.1 (2003): 81–103. . https://doi.org/10.21220/s2-6cs9-4n42.

Conway, Daniel. Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: A Critical Guide. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015

Hanson, Jeffrey. Kierkegaard and the Life of Faith. Indiana, US: Indiana University Press, 2017